The Chronicles of a Capitalist Lawyer

Good Samaritan liability basically means imposing a legal obligation to a bystander (to the extent he has the capacity to help) to save a person in need of help. Thus, in case the bystander fails to save the person in need, and such person is harmed, the bystander will be liable. This is one of the interesting issues discussed in law and economics of torts. The case that inspires me is the Chinese toddler case (you can read the details here), where a Chinese toddler was being struck by a car, and no one helped her for quite a long time until a second car hit her again. When someone actually helped her, it was already too late, and she died in the hospital. If only the bystanders around the toddler helped her immediately, she might be saved and the story will be a happy ending one. Unfortunately, that's not the case here.

I asked some of my LLM Chinese friends in University of Chicago about this case and they confirmed that there was a case in the Supreme Court of China where a person is being penalized for helping an old woman from an accident. The facts of the case were never clear and people make their own conclusions, one of them is that helping other people may cause problem to you, especially when you don't know whether the people are really in need or they are just trying to put a scam on you (apparently, there are also cases where some swindlers trick people by pretending as accident victims and then blame anyone who nice enough to help them).

This is a serious matter, especially under the basic principle that people respond to incentives. If people can't determine whether their altruism as bystanders would be beneficial to all parties or at least don't cause them into any unwarranted trouble, their best rational choice is actually not to help anyone. And that is really bad to the society because it imposes a huge social costs to people in need. They can be helped with small costs, but because people fear that they will be in trouble if they try to help, these people in need end up with nothing or even bigger losses.

Now I remember that one of the comments that I see in Twitter is why not imposing a Good Samaritan liability? We impose liability to bystanders to help those in need in case those bystanders have the capacity to do so and the costs for doing such action would be low and lesser than the losses imposed to the victim due to the inflicted harm. Example: you're trying to cross the street and suddenly a car in full speed is about to hit you. I can easily save you by holding your hand and thus prevent you from being hit by the car. Doing that will not cause any additional risks to me (the car will not hit me) and if I don't do that minor action you'll die or at least be significantly injured.

Some people argue that liability should be imposed to me in this case based on the least cost avoider principle under the famous Hand's Formula (if you want to know more about Judge Learned Hand, see here). The principle basically says that a person should only be liable for torts in case the costs to avoid such harm (taking precautions) is lower than the loss imposed to the victim multiplied by the probability of the occurrence of such losses. Using standard economic approach, it's difficult to resist the strength of this argument, after all, the costs are lower than the benefits, surely, we should impose such duty to give the correct incentive for people to help other people.

However, I find this kind of approach as simply perverse. Not from morality point of view, but from an advance economic analysis. First of all, there is a problem of causation. It's easier to pinpoint a causation effect from an action rather from omission (as a caveat, I would like to emphasize that it's easier not easy). The standard of proof would be very expensive to prove causation in a case of omission. There is no solid evidence that even when I hold your hand, I can save you from a significant injury, after all it's an "ïf only"case. If you can't impose causation, how can you hold responsibility in economic terms? An easier solution for my hypothetical case is to impose liability to the car driver, because he is the one who hits you. In reality, if you survive, you will most likely sue him. If not, your family will sue him. And that would be easier for all parties.

Second, if we apply the notion that we are legally obliged to help other people whenever we are the least cost avoider (and there will be sanctions for failure to do so), it would be a disaster. Let us use an extreme case, imagine that there is a hungry child in front of you (you don't know him at all). Without food, he will not survive. You don't help him even though you are able to do so and he died shortly. Should you be liable in this case? My answer is no and it's for good reason. It will impose an enormous costs to everyone to always be aware whether there are people in need around them. Furthermore, the costs for enforcement will also be humongous. People will start to sue other people if they don't get help in case they think that they can be helped by bystanders. It can turn out to be a lucrative business for lawyers, but for great expenses to the society.

One solution to this, which has already been incorporated in our penal code, is to impose liability only to specific people who have clear legal duties to take care of such people in need. Example: duty of care by parents to their child. This can be an efficient rule if the duty is strictly imposed to people who have control over the people in need and therefore are in a better position to understand the need of such people.

Another solution is to protect bystanders from any liability in case they try to help. You don't need to give additional benefits to altruists, after all for these guys, helping other people has already increased their utility. But you may want to protect them from liability imposed by their good intentional action. The problem with this rule is again standard of proof in causation. Like I said above, in case of omission, it is harder to perceive the causation. But once an action has been done, that action can be placed in the causation analysis.

A no liability rule for all helpers might not be efficient in cases where bystanders don't actually help and instead cause additional problems. So another set of rule can be added, i.e. the no liability rule will only be applicable for bystanders who can show good faith in his actions and have the minimum reasonable skills to help. In this case, hopefully, people having no capabilities to help will stay away from helping other people in need and therefore they can avoid unnecessary problems. It's not a perfect system, some people who think that they are reasonably well to help other people may end up liable for reckless help but it is better than creating a system where everyone is not liable and thus there are less incentives to be careful in helping other people.

Today is my 28th birthday and I guess it would be nice to start a-once-in-a-year reflection in my blog (started it in 2009, but completely forgot to follow up in 2010, typical). I will not make any reflection about my life (nothing to reflect, it's a damn good life anyway), so for this year, I'll reflect the development of my own legal thoughts.

I started my formal legal education in 2001 without knowing a thing about the law, I didn't know whether I will be interested with it or what I will do after I graduated. My primary reasons at that time? Just following my intuition plus chasing my dream of being admitted at the University of Indonesia (my second choice was UI's Political Science, don't ask me why I picked that, cause I can't answer that even until today). So yes, it's more about getting into UI rather than picking a subject that I really like. Fortunately, I was lucky. By the second semester I knew for sure that I love this subject!

At first, my primary choice of specialization was constitutional law. 2001 was the time where many constitutional law professors secured high positions within Indonesian government. It was a transition era in the Republic and constitutional scholars were needed to guide the process. However, a fated encounter with a really weird lecturer caused me to change my mind entirely. It was so bad that I said to myself, "all the good professors are in the government now and we're stuck with these buffoons. Like hell I will take constitutional laws." So I decided to specialize in other fields: procedural and business laws. Again, I am a lucky guy. Turns out it's a correct decision, as now I work as a corporate lawyer, a profession that I literally enjoy not only professionally, but also academically.

But those things only affect my professional skills. What really affects and shapes my legal thoughts is a whole different subject of law that I accidentally learned during my law school days, i.e. Islamic legal theory. It started with a challenge from my best friend, saying that I will never master Islamic law, because I can't differentiate the type of waters that you could use to purify yourself (wudhu). Of course, knowing how predictable I am, I took that challenge and soon I regularly went to UI's mosque's library. Although I planned to start with the library's classical Islamic law books collection, I ended up with Islamic legal theories first. And I was impressed, by the 9th century, Islamic legal scholars have already developed a concise legal theory that will put common law and civil law scholars at that time to shame.

Granted, the current development of Islamic legal theory is pretty much gloomy (no new development), but I learned something from my personal study, the existence of a theory called Istislah or Maslahah Mursalah, which basically states that legal scholars, in the absence of clear legal rules, should take the welfare maximization of the society as a prime concern in deciding cases. The concept is simple, but the insight is very deep. Such insight helped me to think for the first time about what constitutes a good law.

During my early years, I got an impression that my faculty only taught its students to become technical masters of law. We know the laws, we can easily apply them into concrete cases, and we are proud with that. The famous motto in my faculty, "If you're a law student, always talk with a legal basis." It's nice, but something is missing here. Being a technical master means that you are only acting as a spokesman of the law. You don't care whether it's good or not, heck, that's not even important. This is what I call as an abuse to Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law (See my discussion on Kelsen at here, here, and here).

So for me, this is non sense. This kind of education reduces the profession of lawyers into simple craftsmanship. Lawyers should be able to do more than that, they should be able to work as policy makers, they should analyze the quality of laws and propose a better version if they think that the current ones suck. Istislah theory helped me to see that error earlier and I am thankful for that.

Now, when we're eventually getting into the question of what constitutes a good law, there are various methods to determine the standards. I started with the believe that a good law should reflect the society's sense of justice, local wisdom. But that belief didn't last long. Why? I come to realize that there is no standard for reflecting the society's sense of justice. In the end, it will always be a matter of preference. Suppose the society deems honor killing as a part of their justice system, would we still agree to enforce it in the name of local wisdom?

Logically, I move forward to a standard which seems to be universal and applicable in every situation and condition. So I turned out to legal principles established by religious belief, i.e. Islamic law. Yet, it didn't satisfy me. Years of researches show that other than the agreement among Islamic scholars on the mandatory prayer, fasting, zakat and hajj, there is no unity of opinion in Islamic laws. Cultures or 'urf have a great impact on how scholars interpret the laws and there is a never ending debate on what standards that are deemed applicable for eternity and that are subject to changes. As a result, there isn't any production of worthy new ideas within Islamic law, it's just a repetition of the old ideas and debates that ended in the 15th century. Thus, I concluded that similar to the notion of society's sense of justice, Islamic law is not that reliable for providing a clear standard on what constitutes a good law. FYI, the use of Istislah itself is still controversial within Islamic legal scholars, so that could explain why its development has been halted for a very long time.

Finally, I end up with the law and economics movement. It's ideas of welfare maximization and promotion of efficiency as guidelines for determining a good law really captivate me. First, I see law and economics as the modern interpretation of Istislah theory, its spiritual successor. Second, since it is a combination with economics, it is easier to assess the standards to determine whether they really work or not (empirical research is very encouraged in this field and I think it is very helpful). Furthermore, economics is a science that can be applied to almost every aspect of human life, so applying such science into legal conceptions prove to be an eye opening of things that we have already taken as granted. The notion that incentives matters still amaze me on how we can use different incentives to structure a law that will work efficiently and to explain the behavior of the people in facing the law and legal enforcement.

When I choose law and economics as my primary tool for assessing the quality of laws, I don't close the opportunity of using other helpful methods. No tool is perfect, and maybe in the future, we will develop an even better method for analyzing the law. But until that day comes, I'll stick for a while with law and economics.

A couple of days ago, I received an interesting comment from @tirtasusilo on my latest post. His question is: "How would you persuade someone who is against vote buying because he/she considers voting a duty, not a commodity?" First of all, a rational person should not consider voting as merely a duty as I argue here. But surely, giving that kind of answer would be cheap. So I'll try to answer that question through this post.

What would a person think about his vote if he considers it as a duty? My assumption: he takes voting as a way to do the right thing. He votes because he believes that he does something for the betterment of society. Consequently, voting should never be traded. You don't trade what is right only for money. While his notion might be tempting for a lot of people, I'm afraid I have to say that it is this notion that persuades political parties to use vote buying to get what they want.

First of all, we cannot effectively prevent people from picking their own preferences, whether they want to protect the integrity of their votes or they think that voting is a crap mechanism which means nothing, or that voting is a valuable item that can be traded for a good price, etc. The fact that there are many preferences means that sly politicians can use different methods of persuasion for getting as many support as possible from the voters, including building an image as good politicians in front the media to get votes from the duty oriented guys and using tricky methods (including money and political promises) to gain additional votes from the commodity oriented guys. In this case, we are not maximizing the utility of the duty oriented guys, we're maximizing the utility of politicians and commodity oriented guys.

Now, if duty oriented guys really want to maximize their interest, i.e. preventing politicians from vote buying, they should agree with the system that I proposed, i.e. legalizing vote buying with certain conditions. The reason is simple, such system is created for the sole purpose of reducing vote buying, it is created not to let people trade their votes like crazy but to keep people from buying and selling their votes. Think it as a more efficient solution that basically satisfies the interest of the voters (for getting a better election in term of fairness and quality) and imposes significant additional burden to politicians who dare to use money in getting their support.

Sure, we can always resort to the old school style, such as making vote buying as an illegal act and enforcing heavy punishments against violators of vote buying restriction. The question is: will that be efficient in Indonesia case? How much money do you think that we have spent for the entire national and regional election? These costs include campaign costs, the "hidden" vote buying costs, candidates disputes costs, enforcement costs, etc. Not only that these costs are damn expensive, we still end up with buffoons as our leaders. And being rational, these buffoons will most likely try to do anything to recoup all of their costs during the election. After all, no sane people will go and spend most of his fortunes for securing a position if he don't expect some benefits from getting that position. What could be even worse than that?

So, considering the above argument, if these duty oriented guys really care about doing the right thing, would they pick the "right" method that will produce the "not right" results, or would they pick the seemingly "not right" method that will produce the "right" results?

A week ago, I wrote about using vote buying mechanism to prevent political parties from buying our votes. You can see the article here. Furthermore, there is also an article from Greg Mankiw and Michael Sandel in 2007 on why vote buying should not be allowed. Before I update my proposal, I'll give some comments to Mankiw and Sandel's ideas.

The Inherent Problem of Mankiw and Sandel Cases

The main argument of Mankiw is that vote buying can produce externalities to third parties. I guess there's a grain of truth in his idea, but unfortunately, his example does not make any sense at all. I reproduce his case here for ease or reference:

"Suppose three voters are deciding whether to provide a public good that costs $9, which would be financed by a $3 tax on each voter. Andy values the public good at $8, while Ben and Carl do not value it at all. Under majority voting, Ben and Carl vote against, and the public good does not get provided, which is the efficient outcome.

Suppose, however, that Andy could buy Ben's vote for $4. He could then ensure the project gets passed. Andy is better off by $1 (the $8 benefit minus the $3 tax and the $4 price of the vote), Ben is better off by $1 (the $4 price of the vote minus the $3 tax), and Carl is worse off by $3 (the $3 tax). The Andy-Ben vote deal has negative externalities on Carl."

What's the main problem of his case above that can be answered by public choice theory? His case stops at the fact that Carl is worse off by $3. If Carl is a rational person, what would he do? He can also offer to purchase Ben's votes for $2, after all, losing $2 dollar is better than losing $3 and for Ben, receiving $2 is surely more attractive than receiving a net benefit of $1 from Andy.

Then what will Andy do? He can choose to increase his offer to $5 for Ben's vote and therefore receives no benefit from the policy. At this point, Andy's marginal cost equals his marginal benefit, it's the point where he should stop because any further increase on the price of Ben's vote will cause losses to him. What would be the proper response of Carl? He can stop, or he can also choose to offer $3 dollar for Ben's vote. It's the same for him both ways, if he stops, he will lose $3 anyway, so he still has the incentive to offer such $3 (marginal cost equals marginal benefit). Now, if Andy is rational, he will stop, because he knows that proceeding with the vote buying battle will only end up with further losses. How about Carl, should he pay Ben? No, because his offer is basically only valid when Andy still wants to buy Ben's vote. There is no need for him to pay Ben if in the end Carl cancels his plan. Of course you can say that under this circumstance, Andy will come again to offer Ben to sell his votes. True, but then Carl can also do the same and a problem of cycling will be created.

Sandel's argument is more persuasive, he shows that it is possible for Andy to actually persuade Ben to establish a value for the proposal and therefore he will vote in favor of Andy's proposal without having Andy to buy Ben's vote. In this case, Sandel argues that the end result will be the same for both cases (involving vote buying or not), there will be some costs imposed to Carl. However, even in this case, Carl can always offer to buy Ben's vote for a price.

Sandel says that suppose Ben values the proposal for $4 after hearing Andy's persuasion, meaning that he will reap a benefit of $1 if he vote for the proposal. What can Carl do? Of course, he will offer Ben $2. What will then Andy do? He can offer a price of $5 to buy Ben's vote and then Carl will offer Ben a price of $3, and Andy will face the same problem again. Another cycling will be made in Sandel's case.

The simple problems created by Mankiw and Sandel actually resemble the real political life. It's a case of battle between interest groups where benefits will be spread to the majority by imposing costs to a group (wide spread benefit vs narrow cost). Of course, the group will not just sit and wait for the impeding doom. They will fight for their right and if they have to lose something, they will make sure that at least it shouldn't exceed their total expected costs should the problematic policy is promulgated. I'll deal with this issue in another post. Now, let's return to my further elaborated proposal.

The Elaborated Proposal for Vote Buying

Since I'm still in favor of vote buying for Indonesia, I'll try to elaborate more my original proposal in this post. Further comments and questions will be much appreciated.

The basic principle is that in a general election, voting is the commodity, people are the sellers, and political parties are buyers. Now, what's the main reason for political parties to buy our votes? Assuming that these guys are rational, I would say that they buy our votes on the basis that the expected benefits that they will reap after they secure a position are still bigger than the total expected costs that they will incur during the election. The costs can include campaign costs and any penal sanctions that may be imposed to them if they're caught (vote buying is still illegal in Indonesia).

However, as I've said numerous times, you can't separate law from the legal enforcement. In our country, it is safe to assume that the probability of being caught and sentenced for vote buying is quite slim, meaning the costs of getting caught is not that big and therefore there is less incentive for complying with the law. In this case my proposal would be: vote buying should be legalized, any political parties are allowed to actually come to us and offer a price for our vote. This is the basic proposal, but to ensure that it can work, I'll add some additional rules.

1. Minimum Price Cap

There should be a minimum price cap for our votes which reflects the expected benefits of the political parties should they win the election. I would say though that since the number of Indonesian citizens are very huge, increasing a little bit of the price of our votes would have significant financial impact to our political parties in case we can't assess their expected benefits (so at least we impose higher costs to them). Say that the current market price of our vote is around Rp50,000 per vote and then we increase that to Rp55,000 per vote. Assuming that there will be at least 100 million voters, an increase of Rp5,000 per vote is equal to an additional total costs of Rp500,000,000,000 or around US$55,000,000.

2. Bidding System

We can choose two systems to sell our votes. The first is by using the rule of Tullock Auction (Gordon Tullock is a famous public choice theorist), where all political parties can bid for our votes and the highest bidder will win all of our votes, however, the ones who lose the bid will also be required to actually pay the amount that they have offered during the bid process to us.

Second, we can use a system where each political party can bid for our votes by paying us directly, but: (i) they are required to disclose the amount publicly (or we can ask the media to do that), (ii) they are required to deposit a non-refundable minimum amount to us for their offering (say 10-15% of the offer price); (iii) there would be no legal guarantee that the voter will vote in accordance with the bid winner, meaning, the winning political party can't go to the court to enforce their right to be voted by us, and (iv) the political parties can always change their offering to us until the date we walk to the election booth and set our vote.

You may say that the above system is crazy, no one would like to enter into this kind of arrangement where the seller position is absolute. But that is precisely why we need to adapt this kind of system. In the current system, it is very hard to prove that political parties are involved in money politics. Have you ever considered the costs imposed to us for all of these hidden money politics and also the total costs of the national and general elections (all of those disputes in the Constitutional Court and the re-elections)? Not only it's a waste of tax payers money, it also does not provide us with the best candidates to lead our country.

Under my proposed system, there would be less incentives for political parties to buy our votes. Why? First, we eliminate small parties by this system, leaving all the major parties in a competition to rule us all. Second, unless there is a super political party with infinite source of funds, no one will ever win the vote bidding.

Let me tell you how this will work in practice by using an assumption that there are 3 parties, A, B, and C and that each party has more or less the same financial condition. Each of A, B, and C would have the incentives to win the election because they know that they can win the election by money and that the losing party will most likely lose everything. Since they all know the other party prices, they will continuously try to outbid the other party until they exhaust all of their money, creating a cycling problem. Of course in this case, A can make a coalition with B to defeat C in the vote bidding, but C can also offer B to instead cooperate with it and defeat A. Another infinite cycling will also be created here.

Furthermore, since there is no guarantee that people will vote for they who pay the most, there are incentives for these parties to offer things other than money to induce people to vote them and I'm quite certain that there would be no case where we end up with an absolute winner after the vote bidding fight just because it pay the most.

Their only solution is to actually agree to stop using money and induce voters to vote them for other reasons. True that under this regime, there would always be an incentive to betray such agreement, but since it will create another cycling problem, they will be forced to comply. Suppose A, B and C agree that they will not use money to buy our votes. Then, B realizes since it is still legal to buy our votes, they can try to buy our votes behind A and C. A and C, fearing something might happen behind their back, will start to have the same incentives and will also return to money politics. You see where this is going? So the conclusion is clear: stop using money to buy our votes or end up being caught in an infinite vicious cycle.

Of course this is not a bullet proof mechanism, if A, B, and C have a very stable coalition, we would be in big trouble. But I guess that would not happen in Indonesia, after all , no groups of robbers will ever have a stable coalition since each of them would try to maximize their own benefits on the expense of others. For further readings, try searching in Google for Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.

If there is only one thing that I can be confident about Indonesia, that must be the notion that most Indonesian citizens hate their legislators. How couldn't we? We rarely (read: never) hear any good news about them, and we oftenly (read: all the time) hear about how irresponsible they are with their job. Remember how they lavishly spend the state budget for their ridiculous comparative study in foreign countries? How they plan to build a new potentially (read: absolutely) useless new building? How they can't meet their yearly target for issuing new laws? (though considering their capabilities, this might be a bless in disguise)

Before you're planning for a bloody revolution, try to think about it again. Aren't these legislators the product of our beloved democracy? After all, it's the people who vote them as our representatives. But why do they betray their own constituents? It seems as if they only think about themselves or the interest of certain minority groups who have the means and funds to purchase these legislators voices in the house of representative. In reality, these interest groups don't have enough voices to put the legislators in their current position. Yet, it's clear that these groups have more control over the legislators compared to the majority of the people, i.e. us. How could that be? Should we say that democracy is a total failure? Will we have a better chance under the rule of a benevolent dictator?

The Problem of Collective Action

Public Choice theory has a very good answer for this problem (by the way, public choice theory is basically the application of economic analysis into political theory). In short, we are facing the problem of collective action, which can be further elaborated into three main issues: (i) high transaction costs, making coordination within a large group almost impossible, (ii) free rider issue within uncoordinated group, keeping people from working together (creating a vicious cycle along the way), and (iii) internalization of the interest groups' costs among a lot of people tends to lower the average costs that must be borne by each individual, giving less incentive for the people to fight back. Let's discuss this one by one.

In general, we, the people, are pretty much diversified. There are too many scattered interests and the costs for coordinating us into a single systematic group where each person knows perfectly other people needs, would be too expensive. Unfortunately, the case is different with interest groups. Because they are smaller in numbers, it is easier for them to coordinate among themselves, meaning less transaction costs to work together in order to satisfy their interests. This might seem obvious and logical but most people tend to underestimate this important factor. Why do you think we embrace the idea of decentralization?

Without any effective mechanism for coordination, surely it would be very difficult for the majority to fight back. Here is where the free rider issue arises. Suppose you really want to fight back the legislators and the interest groups, you want to show them that the people are not toys to play with. To do this, you plan to invest your money in making an awareness campaign, letting people know that their legislators suck and that we can't let that happen anymore in the next election. But just when you're about to cash your check, you start to think, "wait, if I'm putting my money now, will many people agree with me and support my effort, or will they just enjoy the fruit of my efforts by doing nothing?" Unless you're a saint or you have your own interest group, you'll probably reconsider your decision and then you will wait for other people to start the effort. See the vicious cycle here?

Finally, there is a major issue of cost internalization. When interest groups and our legislators are making policies that benefit themselves, they impose additional social costs to the rest of the people. Imagine the wasted tax money that they use for unnecessary spending, or imagine the additional burden that consumers will need to pay when interest groups, say in the form of pollutants, can induce the legislators to let them free from being responsible for the externalities caused by them to the society. Yet, since these additional costs are imposed upon a diversified group, most of the people only bear a fraction of the costs. Not to mention that these costs can also be internalized for a long term, lowering the burden to the each individuals. The end result? Less incentives for the majority to fight back since they don't feel the impact as a whole. If they do, they would have done something to prevent the interest groups and the legislators from doing whatever they want. The above things may explain why we had a "successful" reformation (read: revolution) in 1998, but not nowadays.

One Crazy Solution: Why Don't We Sell Our Votes?

So what can we do? Firstly, we need to understand how the majority of Indonesian people view the voting process and how interest groups and legislators perceive the benefit of their position. Do Indonesian people take voting as an important matter or they consider it as a commodity that they can sell for certain price? Furthermore, how do the majority of our legislators perceive their position? For the greater good of the society or for their own benefit (calculating the benefits of having the position minus the costs of getting appointed).

If the latter is correct, the solution would be to impose an excessive price for people's votes. My main idea is: rather than imposing a sanction for political parties which try to manipulate the vote by using money, give the freedom to them to use their money as they like. Why? In a country where the price of a vote is cheap and the legal authorities are weak, there is no way for a clean political party to win against those who use money in their campaign (money is real, talk is cheap). Having said that, why don't we say to the people that they should vote for whoever can purchase their votes for the highest price (of course there should be a minimum cap for such price reflecting as close as possible the benefit that the legislators might receive from getting the position, e.g payment from interest groups).

The more expensive the vote is, the better. The expected results are: (i) interest groups and political parties will be forced to exhaust their own resources for wasteful acts, i.e. spending a lot of money though there will be only one winner, and (ii) along with the increase in costs of buying votes, less interest groups will join the game since the expected benefits are going down to almost nothing. Through this solution, we're imposing a collective action problem to the political parties. They might work well as a single group, but if we put them in a situation where the most optimal way to reduce their costs is to not paying anyone, they will also face the same problem that larger groups face.

Let's see how my solution work. If parties continue to pay for getting their votes, some of the smaller parties will soon realize that it is not worth it and stop playing. At this stage, it is safe to assume that the remaining players are the major ones. You may think, now we're doomed, we have major players controlling the game and no one can fight it. Not necessarily! These major players have two options: (i) they can continue to compete in spending a lot of money for getting votes or (ii) they can reach a mutual consensus that no one will use money in their campaign. Of course since none of them can trust each other (collective action problem), they will continue to spend their money to the extent that they will have no more resources to spend. In the end, when they have exhausted all of their resources, they will be forced not to use money anymore in their campaign or they will face the risk of having a vicious cycle of unnecessary money spending.

Suggestions and comments are welcomed.

Yesterday morning, I had a nice discussion with one of my juniors in the Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia, @najmulaila, concerning the concept of legal awareness. The basic case is quite simple, she's complaining about the law students' attitude who make a right turn within the faculty, despite knowing that it is clearly prohibited. She further argued that it's useless to talk about legal compliance in Indonesia if these students don't follow the rules themselves. After all, according to her, what's the purpose of knowing the laws, if you don't comply with them? Suffice to say, she is a proponent of legal awareness campaign, i.e. having more awareness of the law should be translated into an increase in legal compliance.

Here where I quickly have a different opinion. Knowing the law does not necessarily mean that you will comply with such law. The reason is simple and can be traced back to the basic assumption of Law and Economics, people are rational being and they respond to incentives. From the fact that most students violate the no-turning-right rule, I can conclude that the Faculty has not imposed any sanctions to the violators. No sanctions means no costs to these students to violate the rule. Hence, what are the incentives for them to comply? Surely we can't assume that these young students are those "righteous people" who will follow the law simply because it is the right thing to do as depicted in legal philosophy course. Plato always dreams of having a philosopher as the king because he exactly knows that it is impossible to have such king in the real world.

Of course, being a diligent law student, she didn't immediately agree with me and instead offered another argument: my line of thinking is the same with corruptors! They corrupt because they know that the benefit of corruption is bigger than the costs (such as going to the prison). I almost shouted "EUREKA" when she actually said that because it is precisely what I have argued before in some of my posts (here and here). This is how Law and Economics explains the behavior of criminals, they calculate the costs and benefits of their criminal acts and whenever they decide that the benefits exceed the costs, they will most likely conduct the crime.

If we think it through, assuming that knowing the law will increase legal compliance is a dangerous assumption, because it is a highly misguided assessment of human behavior, and there are many consequences to such assumption. Take the law students case as an example. You can always say to them how humiliating their act is, but unless the Faculty takes a real action toward the violators or unless making a right turn will cause the students to be involved in a serious accident, I bet that the rate of violations will never decrease significantly. What do you expect? Are these students hypocrites? I don't think so. They are mere human.

Another example: it is possible that the people who understand the law can find a leeway and use such understanding for their own benefits which of course is not in line with our hope that increasing their awareness will induce them to comply with the law. So what should we do? The answer is better legal enforcement! Legal enforcement should never be separated from the law itself.

You can make the best law in the world, but if you have no one to enforce it, such law would be meaningless. This is especially true when you are trying to regulate people's behavior. Oliver Wendell Holmes correctly pointed out that people are only interested with what judges will do with the law. In other words, people are more interested to know what legal authorities will decide against them in certain cases and not only what the law say.

By this, I'm not talking only about criminal law, this is applicable for any subject of law. Suppose there is a law saying that certain contracts are prohibited and will be deemed void by operation of law if people entered into such contracts. If people know that the judges will declare these contracts null and void whenever the parties bring them to the court, they will most likely not sign these contracts in the first place.

So there we have it, a short discussion on how we should take a look at the law. One important thing that I learn from Law and Economics: some of the concepts are so obvious that people tend to disregard them entirely. At least that's the experience of Ronald Coase and his concept of Transaction Cost. The concept was made when he's still in his 20s and yet, he received his Nobel Prize in his 80s. It took 60 years for people to realize a concept that is so obvious to everyone if they think it through. Ain't that crazy?