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Showing posts with label Anti Corruption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Anti Corruption. Show all posts
  • Sekali Lagi Soal Praperadilan Terhadap Penetapan Status Tersangka


    Berhubung Putusan Praperadilan terhadap penetapan Budi Gunawan sebagai tersangka sudah bisa diakses di sini, saya perlu memperbaharui analisis yang saya buat sebelumnya di sini (dimana analisisnya dibuat berdasarkan ringkasan berita). Harus diakui, walaupun saya tidak sepenuhnya setuju dengan isi putusan Hakim Sarpin, ini tetap merupakan putusan yang menarik dan pertimbangannya tidak tampak dibuat asal jadi. Saya akan memfokuskan pembahasan saya pada 5 isu yang sedang ramai dibicarakan.

    Pertama, sejauh mana penafsiran hukum diperbolehkan dalam kasus seperti ini? Kedua, apakah benar penetapan status tersangka tidak menciderai hak seseorang? Ketiga, apakah pemeriksaan terhadap penetapan status tersangka pada prinsipnya sudah memasuki ranah materi perkara sehingga tidak bisa diselesaikan melalui praperadilan? Keempat, apa sebenarnya yang dimaksud dengan penegak hukum dan bagaimana hubungannya dengan kewenangan penyidik untuk menetapkan seseorang menjadi tersangka? Terakhir, langkah apa yang sebaiknya diambil oleh KPK?

    Sebagaimana sudah diduga sebelumnya, Hakim Sarpin menggunakan Pasal 5 dan 10 UU Kekuasaan Kehakiman tentang kewajiban hakim untuk tidak menolak suatu perkara karena belum ada aturannya serta kewajiban hakim untuk menggali dan memahami nilai-nilai hukum dan rasa keadilan yang hidup di masyarakat sebagai dasar untuk membuka kemungkinan adanya mekanisme praperadilan terhadap penetapan status tersangka.

    Penggunaan alasan ini sah-sah saja, tetapi perlu elaborasi lebih lanjut. Tidak bisa menolak perkara tidak berarti harus serta merta membuka mekanisme praperadilan terhadap status tersangka yang memang tidak diatur secara eksplisit dalam KUHAP. Hakim tetap bisa menerima perkara tersebut dan kemudian menyatakan bahwa mekanisme Praperadilan tidak bisa digunakan untuk memeriksa keabsahan penetapan tersangka. Selain itu, apa pula yang dimaksud dengan nilai-nilai hukum dan rasa keadilan masyarakat? Pasal tersebut merupakan pasal karet dan bisa digunakan untuk memberikan justifikasi atas banyak hal, baik positif maupun negatif kecuali hakim-hakim di Indonesia sudah siap menggunakan data empiris. 

    Alasan yang lebih tepat untuk membuka pintu penafsiran menurut saya adalah karena KUHAP sendiri tidak tegas melarang penggunaan mekanisme praperadilan terhadap penetapan status tersangka. Apakah pembatasan dalam KUHAP tersebut bersifat mutlak atau tidak? Apakah kalau ada orang yang dirugikan haknya karena dinyatakan sebagai tersangka maka dia tidak memiliki sarana apapun untuk memperjuangkan haknya di muka pengadilan? Tentu akan ada yang berpendapat bahwa pembatasan ruang lingkup kewenangan praperadilan bersifat absolut. Tetapi secara tekstual, ada 2 jawaban rasional yang dimungkinkan dan itu berarti bahwa hakim perlu melihat alasan lainnya untuk mengambil keputusan dan juga perlu membuat isu ini menjadi jelas. Seandainya KUHAP tegas melarang digunakannya praperadilan untuk hal-hal selain yang diatur dalam Pasal 77 KUHAP, saya bisa dengan mudah menyatakan bahwa Hakim Sarpin gagal total dengan putusannya.

    Saya perhatikan bahwa Hakim Sarpin juga menggunakan ide bahwa karena tidak ada yurisprudensi yang berlaku mengikat dalam sistem hukum Indonesia, maka kalaupun putusannya berbeda atau sama dengan putusan sebelumnya, hal tersebut tidaklah terlalu relevan. Walaupun saya menyayangkan pola pikir seperti ini, tetapi argumen Hakim Sarpin ada benarnya. Daripada meributkan fakta bahwa hakim yang pernah mengabulkan praperadilan untuk penetapan status tersangka di masa lalu pernah terkena sanksi administratif oleh Mahkamah Agung (untuk menunjukkan bahwa putusan tersebut tidak disetujui MA secara implisit), akan lebih baik apabila para pihak saling mencari dalil teoritis yang kuat untuk menunjukkan mengapa praperadilan bisa digunakan untuk memeriksa keabsahan penetapan tersangka atau tidak.    

    Berikutnya isu kedua, benarkah penetapan status tersangka tidak menciderai hak seorang warga negara sebagaimana diargumenkan salah satu saksi ahli KPK? Saya tidak sepakat. Penetapan status tersangka jelas menciderai hak seseorang. Ada stigma terhadap dirinya dan sewaktu-waktu ia bisa dikenakan upaya paksa yang pelaksanaannya sangat subjektif. Ia juga bisa dicekal sehingga tidak dapat bebas berpergian. Dalam beberapa kasus, status tersangka bisa menyebabkan seseorang kehilangan jabatan. Contoh gampangnya adalah Bambang Widjojanto dan Abraham Samad yang kini diberhentikan sementara dari jabatannya sebagai komisioner KPK. Sekalipun belum ditahan, pemeriksaan sebagai tersangka juga jelas akan memakan waktu si tersangka. Masih ingat kasus Benhan? Dia tidak ditahan, tetapi harus bolak balik luar kota - Jakarta karena memenuhi panggilan pemeriksaan penyidik.

    Tentu saja tidak semua beban terhadap tersangka memberikan legitimasi kepada tersangka untuk meminta pencabutan statusnya sebagai tersangka. Kalau alasan penolakan penetapan tersangka adalah semata-mata karena si tersangka merasa dibebani, tentu semua tersangka akan menggunakan mekanisme praperadilan. Ini mengapa sebenarnya perlu dielaborasi lebih lanjut soal pencideraan hak macam apa yang dapat membuka pintu peradilan bagi penetapan tersangka. Apakah hanya dalam hal penetapan tersangka tersebut sudah berlarut-larut dalam jangka waktu tertentu yang menyebabkan tersangka kehilangan mata pencaharian? Atau dalam hal ada aturan UU yang menyebabkan tersangka tidak bisa mengambil jabatan tertentu? Bisa juga dinyatakan bahwa unsur pencideraan hak semata tidak dapat dijadikan alasan untuk menolak penetapan tersangka. Artinya, pencideraan hak hanya membuka pintu untuk praperadilan sementara penolakan status tersangka akan bergantung pada aspek-aspek lainnya semisal kelemahan bukti permulaan atau masalah wewenang penyidik untuk menyidik perkara tersebut.

    Ini membawa kita kepada isu ketiga. Apakah pemeriksaan praperadilan soal penetapan status tersangka bisa dianggap merupakan pemeriksaan materi pokok perkara yang sebenarnya menjadi wewenang peradilan? Tidak otomatis demikian. Sebagaimana diatur dalam KUHAP, penetapan tersangka bertumpu pada bukti permulaan yang cukup. Definisi bukti permulaan yang cukup inilah yang kemudian menjadi permasalahan karena tidak didefinisikan secara jelas dalam KUHAP. Walaupun dalam prakteknya, bukti permulaan yang cukup didefinisikan sebagai 1 alat bukti yang berdasarkan KUHAP ditambah laporan polisi. Dasar definisi tersebut bisa dilihat di sini.    

    Definisi tersebut sangat rawan penyalahgunaan. Hanya dengan mengandalkan satu alat bukti dan laporan polisi, seseorang bisa dengan mudah dinyatakan sebagai tersangka! Ini mengapa penggunaan lembaga praperadilan menjadi semakin krusial untuk pemeriksaan bukti permulaan yang cukup. Karena sifatnya permulaan, seharusnya tidak bisa dianggap sebagai pemeriksaan pokok perkara. Penyidik sendiri tidak harus khawatir bahwa karena bukti permulaan tidak cukup kemudian tersangka bisa sepenuhnya bebas dari jerat hukum (seandainya memang benar tersangka itu adalah pelaku kejahatan).

    Dalam hal ini, pernyataan tidak sahnya suatu penangkapan tidak berarti bahwa penyidik tidak bisa lagi menetapkan kembali seorang mantan tersangka sebagai tersangka. Kuncinya adalah menemukan alat bukti yang lebih kuat untuk dianggap sebagai bukti permulaan yang cukup. Bahwa kemudian ada resiko nantinya tersangka akan kabur duluan sudah merupakan bagian dari resiko pekerjaan. Sudah seharusnya penyidik tidak sembarangan menetapkan seseorang menjadi tersangka untuk kemudian membiarkan kasus tersebut terbengkalai sambil menyandera si tersangka terus menerus. Saatnya mengakhiri kekuasaan mutlak penyidik dalam menetapkan seseorang menjadi tersangka!

    Namun demikian, ada juga kemungkinan dimana penyidik tidak bisa lagi menetapkan si tersangka sebagai tersangka di kemudian hari dalam hal ternyata penyidik tidak berwenang untuk memeriksa si tersangka. Ini isu keempat yang juga terkait dengan pertanyaan soal definisi penegak hukum. Dalam putusan Hakim Sarpin, KPK dianggap tidak berwenang untuk menyidik Budi Gunawan karena jabatan yang dipegang oleh Budi Gunawan terkait tuduhan korupsi yan dilekatkan kepadanya tidak memenuhi definisi pejabat negara maupun penegak hukum, pun kasusnya tidak dianggap meresahkan masyarakat, ataupun menyangkut kerugian negara.

    Masalah kewenangan ini adalah isu yang paling berat bagi KPK karena apabila memang KPK tidak dianggap berwenang menyidik Budi Gunawan, maka KPK sama sekali tidak dapat menetapkan Budi Gunawan sebagai tersangka dan putusan Hakim Sarpin juga menyatakan demikian. Hakim Sarpin nampaknya berpendapat bahwa definisi penegak hukum adalah terbatas hanya pada penyidik dan penyelidik saja. Apakah ini definisi yang tepat? UU KPK memang tidak memberikan definisi mengenai apa yang dimaksud dengan penegak hukum. Ketentuan tentang hal tersebut tersebar di berbagai undang-undang. Dan kalau bicara secara luas, advokat pun termasuk penegak hukum.

    Yang menarik adalah, apakah istilah penegak hukum yang dimaksud dalam UU KPK itu merujuk kepada jabatan yang melekat pada seseorang atau hanya pada fungsi jabatan yang sedang dijalankannya? Apabila kita menyatakan bahwa definisi ini melekat pada jabatan, maka Budi Gunawan otomatis dikategorikan sebagai penegak hukum karena dia menjabat sebagai polisi. Apabila terbatas pada fungsi, bisa jadi Budi Gunawan memang tidak dikategorikan sebagai penegak hukum dalam kapasitasnya selaku Kepala Biro Pembinaan Karier Staf Deputi Sumber Daya Manusia Polri ("Karo Binkar").

    Sayangnya, dalam jawabannya, KPK tidak memberikan bantahan terhadap pengertian penegak hukum yang didalilkan oleh Budi Gunawan. Menurut saya, bahkan seandainya kita menganggap bahwa istilah penegak hukum adalah terbatas pada fungsi, sebenarnya masih tetap terbuka kemungkinan bagi KPK untuk menetapkan Budi Gunawan sebagai tersangka. Konteksnya, apakah dengan menjadi Karo Binkar, Budi Gunawan kemudian kehilangan status dan wewenangnya sebagai polisi yang notabene merupakan penegak hukum? Karena kalau tidak, perlu dilihat lebih lanjut apakah penerimaan suap yang dituduhkan itu murni terkait dengan jabatannya sebagai Karo Binkar, atau dalam kapasitasnya sebagai penegak hukum.

    Yang pasti, saya menyadari bahwa definisi penegak hukum dalam UU KPK masih membuka ruang interpretasi dan besar kemungkinannya bahwa argumen Hakim Sarpin dapat dibantah. Dengan demikan, terdapat permasalahan hukum yang masih perlu ditegaskan oleh Mahkamah Agung sehingga tidak ada kerancuan lagi di masa depan.

    Terakhir, langkah apa yang perlu diambil oleh KPK? Sebagaimana saya sampaikan di atas, dampak putusan praperadilan adalah bukan berarti Budi Gunawan kebal hukum dan tidak bisa dinyatakan sebagai tersangka lagi di masa depan. Aturan nebis in idem (perkara yang sama tidak boleh diadili 2 kali) tidak berlaku di sini karena kita belum memasuki pokok materi perkara. Seandainya isunya adalah terbatas soal lemahnya bukti permulaan yang cukup, KPK bisa dengan mudah memperbaharui buktinya dan menetapkan kembali Budi Gunawan sebagai tersangka. Namun, putusan Hakim Sarpin juga menyatakan bahwa KPK tidak berwenang menyidik Budi Gunawan.

    Untuk itu, KPK bisa memilih untuk melimpahkan perkara ini kepada kepolisian atau kejaksaan. Apabila dirasa kedua institusi tersebut terlalu bias terhadap Budi Gunawan, langkah lainnya adalah mengajukan Peninjauan Kembali kepada Mahkamah Agung mengingat masih ada isu hukum yang perlu diklarifikasikan kembali. Saya tahu KPK bersikeras ingin mencegah adanya mekanisme praperadilan bagi tersangka, tapi kalau KPK peduli pada hak tersangka-tersangka lainnya yang seringkali dicederai dengan rekayasa kasus dan sekaligus juga membantu mencegah kriminalisasi terhadap pejabat-pejabat KPK, KPK dapat memfokuskan permohonan peninjauan kembalinya pada aspek wewenang KPK untuk menyidik Budi Gunawan (khususnya soal definisi penegak hukum). Hal tersebut sudah cukup sebenarnya bagi KPK untuk tetap bisa melanjutkan kasus ini.

    Saya pribadi berharap kasus ini tidak ditinjau kembali dan menjadi putusan yang sudah benar-benar berkekuatan hukum tetap. Polisi sendiri sekarang sudah mengakui adanya mekanisme praperadilan terhadap penetapan status tersangka karena mereka secara terbuka menggunakan mekanisme ini untuk urusan mereka. Ini momen langka, sampai-sampai dalam kasus Abraham Samad, polisi saja mempersilakan Samad untuk mengajukan praperadilan (dan sayangnya Samad tetap tidak mau mengajukan praperadilan).

    Kalau dikatakan bahwa membuka pintu praperadilan untuk penetapan tersangka akan merusak hukum Indonesia, saya sangat meragukannya. Pintunya tidak tertutup secara mutlak dalam KUHAP dan senjata ini bisa digunakan untuk hal yang baik maupun yang buruk. Mengapa tidak kita gunakan untuk sebanyak-banyaknya kepentingan yang positif? Atau ini semua cuma masalah gengsi belaka? Tunggu sampai semua yang katanya "orang baik" dinyatakan sebagai tersangka dengan tuduhan kejahatan yang culun? Percayalah, jadi baik saja tidak cukup di dunia ini, anda juga harus jadi orang pintar. Kecuali anda serius berpikir doa dan teriak-teriak di media saja cukup untuk mengubah status tersangka tersebut. Semoga KPK mengambil langkah yang tepat.

  • Impoverishing Corruptors, Why Not?


    The idea of impoverishing corruptors is not a new one. In fact our Anti-Corruption Law allows the state to confiscate the assets of convicted corruptors and requires them to prove that their assets are not the product of corruption in order to get them back. But this idea has been generally accepted with mixed feelings. 

    Some people believe that seizing the assets of corrupt individuals that were not actually acquired through corruption is a violation of human rights, especially when the state takes those assets for good. For them, the state should only take assets of corruption. I think this is a ridiculous idea, and I will tell you why. 

    Sanctions are sanctions. Why do we have sanctions? Because we want to impose costs on the criminals, we want to let them fully understand the notion that crime does not pay. Because if crime pays, people will have more incentive to commit crimes.

    To achieve that, we must ensure that whatever benefits criminals receive, the state will take it back, and impose additional costs on them, making clear that the costs of criminal activities will always outweigh the benefits.

    Furthermore, the lower the probability of getting caught, the higher the sanctions should be. Why? This is to compensate for the fact that some people might not get caught and therefore will suffer no costs for their crimes. Of course, we need to take into account this probability and let people know that if they get caught they will receive a higher punishment. 

    Having said that, I will argue that a prison sentence is not a cost-efficient type of sanction. The benefits of sending criminals to prison are highly questionable. The costs are very clear. First, taxpayer money is being used to pay for these criminal lives in the prisons. Second, there is no guarantee that prisons will change them into better people (at least in the current conditions in Indonesia). Third, there is always a possibility that richer inmates can bribe prison guards for their own benefit, simply because being a prison guard is not a well-paid job.

    People should also understand that sending people to prison is actually a violation of human rights; you restrict the freedom of the criminals. Now if you can agree with prison sanctions, how could you say that taking the assets of criminals is against human rights? That does not make any sense.

    I think this is the right time to think carefully about what type of sanctions we should develop in Indonesia and how we can utilize each type of sanction to deal with various types of crimes. Using prison and fines as the main sanctions is no longer enough. After all, all crimes have their own characteristics and underlying incentives.

    The incentives that lead people to corruption might be entirely different from the incentives that lead people to, say, murder or rape. Understanding the incentives of these different crimes will help us in designing effective and efficient sanctions.

    So let us return to the case of impoverishing corruptors. Money and other types of valuable assets are the bloodline of corruptions. Based on a simple economic analysis, we can say that people engage in corruption because they perceive that the benefits of doing so will be higher than the costs.

    Suppose the value of your corruption assets is $20 million. Assuming that the costs of the sanctions multiplied by the probability of being caught is still lower than $20 million, economic analysis dictates that rational bad men will engage in corruption. This means that even getting back the whole $20 million would not be enough!

    In addition, the people who argue against impoverishing corruptors say that the state should just recover the stolen assets. Again, this is clearly not enough. For each batch of stolen assets there are various opportunity costs for the government where the government could have invested those assets to generate more revenue. There are also costs for recovering those stolen assets. The law  enforcement system is not free.

    Thus, it makes sense that the state should not only recover the stolen assets, but also the expected profits and interest that it would have received if those assets could have been used by the government in the first place, plus the whole cost of the criminal proceedings. Meaning that if a corruptor takes $20 million, he must be required to repay a lot more than that.

    I do not see any good reason why we should not impoverish corruptors. Sending them to prison without taking their assets would only add a burden to the state budget, and is not efficient or maximizing welfare. It’s time to think like economists when dealing with pricey legal issues.
  • Corruption Money and Lawyers Fee


    Recently, I saw an interesting question on Twitter: Are lawyers allowed to receive payments from corruption money? My answer is yes, and there is a good reason for that.

    Based on my personal observation, it seems that there is a belief by the public that lawyers should not represent suspects of corruption cases, and should therefore not receive their money, since it might be tainted with the corruption itself.

    I find this argument to be ridiculous. First of all, under the prevailing laws, if you conduct a transaction with a third party, provided that you act in good faith, there is no need for you to know where the money is coming from.

    From an economics point of view, it is an efficient rule. Imagine the costs to society if we need to know the source of income of all parties that transact with us. This kind of know-your-customer rule is generally applicable only for banking and securities transactions, where the potential of money laundering is high; but this rule should not be applied to the general public transactions.

    Second, every criminal suspect has the right to be represented by a lawyer, whatever his criminal activities are, be it murder, rape, thievery, or corruption. Hating corruptors does not mean that lawyers cannot represent them or receive their money for payment of their service.

    In one of my previous articles, I argued that lawyers have an absolute duty of confidentiality in assisting their clients. This means that the lawyer is prohibited from ever betraying his client, or jeopardizing the interest of his clients in any way. It is the only way to ensure that all criminal suspects will have the same position in front of the law to prevent abuse of power by legal enforcers.

    By imposing such duty, even when the lawyer knows that his client is guilty, it does not mean that he can suddenly report his client to the relevant authorities. Once he represents the client, the duty must be applied at all times. It also means that when the lawyer receives the money and knows it’s coming from corruption, the lawyer should not be required to report the source of such payment to any authority, simply because that will defeat the entire purpose of client-attorney confidentiality.

    At this point, readers might voice their protest over the above rule. How could we let corruption suspects use their money lavishly for paying their lawyers, which can also be used as a cheap tactic for money laundering. Don’t give up hope yet. There are many things that we can do to prevent such a thing from happening.

    While the lawyers are not required to report the source of their payments, the authorities can always require them to report the amount of their fee. Doing so will allow the authorities to determine whether the payment is reasonable or whether it is being used for something suspicious. If it is used for a money laundering purposes, we can expect that the amount will be excessive. Furthermore, in the end, such money will still need to be returned to the corruption suspects. Of course, the authorities may interfere during the process of returning the money.

    It is true that the lawyers are entitled to receive payment for their services, but it does not mean that they may assist their clients in another type of crime. At that point, we can impose liabilities upon the lawyers for abetting money laundering. This will provide less incentives for them to assist their clients in doing so, and the clients will also have less incentives to use the lawyers service for money laundering purposes.

    As a result, we can expect that the payment made by the corruption suspects will only represent the lawyers fee. After all, if the lawyers cannot find a way to transfer the money back, the corruption suspects will never transfer an excessive amount of money to their lawyers in the first place.

    I think this is a win-win solution for all parties to ensure that lawyers can represent their clients properly and protect the integrity of the criminal justice system, while also preventing abuse of the lawyer’s position to help the corruption suspects in securing their corruption assets.

    In law and economics terms, we call this as a pareto efficient rule where we can maximize the welfare of the society without having to impose costs to other parties. And in my opinion, we should always strive for achieving that efficiency if we really care about society.
  • Designing Anti Corruption Policy: A Response to Cafe Salemba's Law for Sale


    A couple of days ago I found this interesting article in Cafe Salemba. Their basic idea is that competition among law enforcers in fighting corruption, i.e. the Commission of Corruption Eradication ("KPK") and the General Attorney Office ("Kejaksaan") is good as it will increase the cost of bribery and the efficiency of the law enforcers. I beg to differ with this approach, since this will only work under 2 basic assumptions: (i) both law enforcers work in a professional and clean manner or both take bribes seriously; and (ii) cases can be easily transferred between law enforcers (though it seems impossible under the double jeopardy rule). Why do we need the above assumptions in order to ensure that the competition system will work? Because if not, one of the law enforcers can act as a save haven for the bad guys simply by guaranteeing the villains that their bribe will work and that they will be protected from the other law enforcer who don't receive any form of bribery, i.e. if you have been handled by the corrupted law enforcer, there is no way that you will be transferred to the other law enforcer. As a result of this, instead of creating healthy competition among law enforcers, we actually create another super criminal organization. Now this is what I called as a true "Law for Sale".

    Designing anti corruption policy is indeed problematic and will need a thorough analysis. However, I would like to raise some general ideas that might be used in fighting corruption. Hopefully this can trigger a bigger discussion on how we can arrange the policy for the greater good of society. My post will deal with two designs, the design of penal sanctions and the design of the law enforcers (as a response to Cafe Salemba's post) Designing Penal Sanction for Anti Corruption Policy In my opinion, with respect to the anti corruption policy, the main focuses of our penal sanctions should be: (i) to ensure that the Government can retrieve all of the stolen assets (together with interests and any lost profits due to the inability to use those assets for certain period of time, and also the costs of investigating the cases); (ii) to prevent corruptors from repeating their criminal conduct and buying their freedom from any penal sanction; and (iii) to prevent the birth of new corruptors by imposing correct incentives. Does Indonesian anti corruption policy follow the above focuses? I don't think so.

    What I see is that we only focus on sending the corruptors to prisons in the name of justice. I hate to say this, but it's useless. What's the purpose of sending these bad guys to the prison if you can't retrieve anything valuable from them and if they can still buy their way out of it? Prison only creates additional costs and expenses. It would be cheaper if we just give them death penalty. But then again, what for?

    The biggest problem of corruption is that it diminishes the state assets. Those assets are supposed to be used for the greater good of the society, and we pay some of those assets from our taxes. Now, if the end result of our anti corruption policy is only to spend additional money to conduct the investigation for the purpose of paying the living expenses of these evil men in the prison, the entire policy is a big failure! It would be cheaper if we just let these corruptors run free. At least we don't need to pay for the expensive investigation process. If we really want to eradicate the corruption in accordance with the above focuses, the penal sanctions should be, among others: (i) taking over the entire assets of the corruptors (thus getting back the missing assets together with all of the interets and the lost profits); (ii) kicking out the corruptors from their official position and preventing them from getting any governmental position for their entire life (thus preventing their ability to repeat their criminal activities); and (iii) announcing the name of the corruptors in publicly accessed media (such as major newspapers) as a sample for their comrades (thus providing a good incentive for other would born corruptors to not follow the same path). Should we send the corruptors to the prison with the sanctions above? I believe, no. Our main interests have been satisfied, why bother imposing additional costs to the tax payer by sending these guys to the prison? What harm can these people do if they don't have any funds and access to perform their criminal activities? Designing Law Enforcers for Anti Corruption Policy In designing the policy for Anti Corruption Law Enforcers, our main focuses should be: (i) to create a task force that can deal with anti corruption cases quickly and efficiently; and (ii) to provide a better incentives for these law enforcers to perform properly. My first suggestion would be: adding more resources to the law enforcers which means that we don't need competition among law enforcers.

    What we need is cooperation and collaboration! If there are 2 law enforcers, their performances should be linked. So a bad or good performance of one law enforcer will affect the other law enforcer. This can be implemented through the financial compensation of both law enforcers. I would prefer one single law enforcer though and add more resources to such body. My second suggestion: we can provide a good financial incentive in the form of granting a portion of the recovered state assets to the law enforcer who can successfully secure those assets from the corruptors. By doing this, we increase the cost of bribery to a new level. Imagine how much a corruptor must pay now to save his ass if he must compete with a portion of his own entire assets? This is also a good incentive to increase the performance of the law enforcers. Now, other than receive an honor as clean and professional law enforcers, they can receive a better financial benefit which is connected with their actual performance. It's time to bring this anti corruption fighting to a whole new business. This is my version of "Law for Sale".
  • On Why Prison is Overrated in Solving Corruption (Indonesian version)


    Here is another piece of article in Politikana discussing the latest sanction for Anggodo. I am more and more convinced that we need a better form of sanction rather than sticking with prison.
  • On DPR and KPK Chief Candidates (Indonesian Version)


    Here is another post in Indonesian language on why the Indonesian Legislative (DPR) cannot reject the two candidates for Chief of the Indonesian Anti Corruption Commission (KPK). I must admit, writing in Indonesian language is a lot easier, far, far easier than writing here in English :p.
  • On Corruption, Prison, and Alternative Sanctions (Indonesian version)


    You can read my post here on why we need to find better alternative sanctions in fighting corruption. Prison is overrated.

  • The Protection of Criminal Suspects in Law and Economics Perspective

    Forthcoming in Jurnal Teropong Edisi RUU KUHAP 2015 | 23 Pages | Posted: 10 May 2015 | Date Written: April 28, 2015

    Public Choice Theory and its Application in Indonesian Legislation System

    24 Pages | Posted: 8 Oct 2012 | Last revised: 8 Nov 2014 | Date Written: October 8, 2012

    Special Purpose Vehicle in Law and Economics Perspective

    Forthcoming in Journal of Indonesia Corruption Watch, 'Pemberantasan Kejahatan Korupsi dan Pencucian Uang yang Dilakukan Korporasi di Sektor Kehutanan', 2013 | 15 Pages | Posted: 22 Aug 2013 | Date Written: August 18, 2013

    Legal Positivism and Law and Economics -- A Defense

    Third Indonesian National Conference of Legal Philosophy, 27-28 August 2013 | 17 Pages | Posted: 22 Aug 2013 | Last revised: 3 Sep 2013 | Date Written: August 22, 2013

    Economic Analysis of Rape Crime: An Introduction

    Jurnal Hukum Jentera Vol 22, No 7 (2012) Januari-April | 14 Pages | Posted: 12 Nov 2011 | Last revised: 8 Oct 2012 | Date Written: May 7, 2012

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